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INTRODUCTION
Cyclically, with different ups and downs in time, antitrust and
intellectual property (“IP”) are perceived as complementary, rather
than inconsistent, bodies of laws which share the same goals of
promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.
Whether this is true or not, potential for conflicts does exist, such as
when unilateral refusals to license, sell, use, or share IP rights by
dominant firms affect the dynamics of competition. Yet, if and under
what conditions this might happen is one of the thorniest facets of the IP
and antitrust interface, even though it is crucial in the knowledge-driven
economy and global trade in a time of exorbitant IP growth.
On the one hand, the legal monopoly based upon IP laws gives the
owner the right to exclude third parties from the protected asset, subject
only to the exceptions established for various purposes by the relevant
domestic and international laws (e.g., experimental use). On the other
hand, when the legal monopoly impacts on market competition,
antitrust enforcement can outlaw or limit the exclusivity and serve as
the grounds for a compulsory license order.
Three outcomes may result from these conflicting situations: 1)
antitrust trumps per se intellectual property, giving ground to an
exception to the exclusivity based upon IP laws; 2) IP trumps per se
antitrust, justifying anticompetitive behaviors and shielding them from
antitrust scrutiny; or 3) antitrust and IP are balanced, the exclusivity
being limited depending on specific circumstances to be ascertained
case-by-case.
A comparative analysis of the current European and American
systems—the two most mature for both antitrust and IP—shows that the
former tends to downplay IP rights in favor of competition, whereas the
latter tends to curtail the imperative of competition to preserve the
exclusivity based upon IP rights. Yet these are only trends, and on the
whole the two systems are still largely unsettled on the matter.
The underlying dilemma is that a broad antitrust intervention, also
through a high rate of compulsory licensing orders, may reduce the
incentives to invest and thus chill the scientific and technological
innovation (a risk apparently more clear in the United States). At the
same time, failure to scrutinize anticompetitive behaviors can result in
foreclosure of markets to the detriment of consumers, competitors, and
the efficiency of the economic system (a risk apparently more clear in
the European Union).
Broadening the view to the international dimension, so far rather
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neglected, gives the occasion to wonder whether there is any bias for the
one or the other solution, or simply to figure out alternative options to
the classical ex-post antitrust enforcement.
Part I of this Article accounts for the legal background on
monopolization claims involving IP rights. Part II provides an overview
of the European and American case law and policy. Part III frames the
key issues within the international setting, while making proposals on
how to go ahead in this field.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: OVERLAPS AND DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES ANTITRUST SYSTEMS
The relevant provisions governing antitrust scrutiny of unilateral
refusal to license IP in the American and European systems are
primarily those addressed to limit conduct by firms which hold (or
attempt to gain in the United States) monopoly power (in the United
States) or dominant position (in the European Union), subject to
certain conditions. These provisions display a high degree of similarity
in their wording and rationale, although some discrepancies do exist.
1
Article 82 (formerly 86) EC Treaty prohibits abuses of dominant
position by one or (rarely) more undertakings affecting trade among
2
member states; § 2 of the Sherman Act condemns any monopolization,
or attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize any part of
3
the trade or commerce among states by a firm with market power.
Crucial, and often critical, for the enforcement of both provisions is
the monopoly power or dominant position analysis, referred to concrete
1. Article 82 EC Treaty—formerly 86: the double number is due to the 1992 Treaty of
Amsterdam, which modified and renumbered the articles within the EC Treaty—reads as
follows: “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.” Treaty Establishing the
European Community art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
2. Under § 2 of the Sherman Act,
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine . . . or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
3. For a thorough comparative analysis of Article 82 EC Treaty and § 2 of the Sherman
Act, see Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad Between
Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: American and European Approaches
Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 455 (2006).
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4

relevant (product and geographical) markets, whereby a wide range of
contending arguments are available to both parties based on the
economic analysis. Yet the possession of monopoly power or dominant
5
position is not unlawful per se, since a “conduct” element is required:
Article 82 EC Treaty lists, as examples, four categories of likely abuses
6
of dominant position, whereas Sherman Act § 2 only relies on
precedent to capture anticompetitive behaviors.
7
As for the differences, relevant for this analysis is that Sherman Act
§ 2 outlaws monopolization and attempted monopolization, i.e.,
behaviors intended to create or maintain monopoly power, whilst
4. See Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207. The European
“dominant position” is defined as the ability of a firm to act independently from competitors,
customers, and consumers. Id. The American “monopoly power” (also used as synonymous
to “market power”) designs the “power to control prices or exclude competition.” See
United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). For Hovenkamp, “[m]arket power
is the ability of a firm to increase its profits by reducing output and charging more than a
competitive price for its product.” Technically it is “a firm’s ability to deviate profitably from
marginal cost [or competitive] pricing.” HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY. THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 798 (1999). In both systems, a high
market share is considered a good proxy to estimate both monopoly power or dominant
position, due to a positive correlation between market power and market share. Sixty to
sixty-five percent market share may establish a prima facie case of market power, although
the presumptive rule is subject to many disputes. See United States Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule
Industries, Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 999 (11th Cir. 1993). Even market share below fifty percent may
ground presumption of dominant position or monopoly power if other factors are present,
such as barriers to entry. See Case 85/76, Hoffman La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
5. Implicit in the “abuse of dominance” concept, the distinction was more blurred in
the American antitrust analysis until Grinnel Corp., which required two elements for a breach
of § 2: (1) monopoly power, and (2) “willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.” Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. at 570. See also Berkey Photo v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979).
6. The non exhaustive list includes:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 82. The concrete meaning of this conduct though lies in the
European “common law” stemming from the case law of the European Commission and
courts.
7. Even if not relevant in this context, the Sherman Act encompasses felonies (if the
requisite state of mind exists), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006), while the European system only sets out
administrative violations sanctioned with fines.
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Article 82 EC Treaty only envisages abuses of an existing dominant
position. Understandably, because any firm tends structurally towards
gaining monopoly profits, the meaning of actual and attempted
monopolization and the weight and length of the underlying intent have
8
been the subject of much dispute since the origin of the Sherman Act.
On the whole, both Article 82 EC Treaty and § 2 of the Sherman
Act aim to regulate the market power concentration and pursue the
goal of discouraging firms from engaging in anticompetitive conduct
based upon monopoly power, resulting among others in competitors
being driven out of the market, hindered in their activity, or discouraged
from entering.
Besides specific differences based on monopolization laws, one must
point out the “structural” distinctiveness of the E.U. and U.S. systems in
the fields of antitrust and IP themselves. First and foremost, the nature
of the laws and rights at stake must be emphasized. In the United
States, both IP and antitrust are primarily matters for federal laws and
9
enforcement, while IP rights—at least patents and copyrights—enjoy
10
constitutional grounds. Here, moreover, patent and copyright misuse
11
doctrines, resulting from the common law and for patents also from

8. In general, the attempt to monopolize offense has a more severe conduct
requirement than the substantive monopolization offense. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW. AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 652 (2d ed. 2002). The attempt to monopolize cases requires a
specific and stronger proof of intent and a dangerous probability of success. See Arezzo,
supra note 3, at 460-62.
9. Since Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790, the patent law has been a wholly
federal, statutory subject. Today the patent law is governed by the Patent Act of 1952, found
in Title 35 U.S.C. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 281 (2003). The current governing
law of copyright, an exclusively federal statutory subject, is the Copyright Act of 1976, found
in Title 17 U.S.C. Id. at 11. Federal trademarks are regulated by the 1946 Trademark Act
(conventionally known as the Lanham Act) Id. at 545. As for antitrust laws, since the origin
they sought to “federalize” the common law of trade restraints, and the 1890 Sherman Act
inaugurated the pursuit of this intent. WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT, 85-99 (1965).
10. “The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Yet the constitutional
endorsement of IP does not give any answer to the question of whether state-granted
monopolies such as patents and copyrights are the exception to the free competition or the
rule: The antitrust laws and primarily the Sherman Act—“the Magna Charta of free
enterprise” competition—are as fundamental to the United States’ economic constitution as
any IP laws. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
11. The misuse doctrine, very distinctive to the American system, provides a defense
(not a cause of action, as antitrust does) to intellectual property infringement claims, when
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statutory provisions, limit the improper use of exclusive rights when
they are used to extend the “scope” beyond the exclusivity granted by
the law. With direct relevance in this context, Congress cut back misuse
doctrine as applied to patents with the Patent Misuse Amendment Act
of 1988, exempting expressly the case of refusal to license from the area
12
of misuse. Even if the provision is internal to the IP system, it may
affect antitrust claims, as it actually did in some cases.
In contrast, the E.U. system faces an inconvenient divergence:
intellectual property is still in no small part a matter for national laws,
13
especially for patents, and IP rights are enforced mostly on a national
14
basis, while competition is primarily a matter of Community law and
enforcement, especially in the modernization era entered into since
Reg. (EC) 1/2003. Moreover, the EC Treaty does not endorse any
appraisal for patents or other IP rights; rather, it only considers IP
rights, in general, as “justified” restrictions or similar to free movements

the IP right owner attempts to improperly extend the scope of the exclusivity. Where it
applies, it renders unenforceable otherwise valid intellectual property rights until its owner
“purges” the misuse. Patent misuse is a statutory remedy. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). Copyright
misuse is judicially created. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir.
1990); Tom W. Bell, Codifying Copyright’s Misuse Defense, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 573.
Notably, even though distinct, misuse doctrine and antitrust laws are “hopelessly entangled”,
as suggested by Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003), who also advocates for IP internal remedies vis-à-vis antitrust
analysis applied through the patent misuse, due to the insufficiency of antitrust analysis to
capture the full range of policy concerns embodied in patent law (such as defensive patents,
patent trolls and tickets, upstream patents, reach-through royalties, over-proliferation of
patent rights, etc.). Id.
12. The relevant provision is 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), which reads as follows: “[n]o
patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right
by reason of his having [. . .] refused to license or use any rights to the patent.” 35 U.S.C. §
271(d)(4) (2006). Under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), the patent owner has the statutory right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention, while under 35
U.S.C. § 271, the infringement refers to making, using, offering to sell or selling any patented
invention, within the United States, or importing into the United States any patented
invention, during the term of the patent.
13. For example, Community Work for a Council Regulation on the Community
Patent had been carried on since 2000, but the debate is still hot. See http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). The European
patents, granted under the European Patent Convention, are embedded into each national
selected system after the issuance by the European Patent Office. Copyright is only to a
certain extent harmonized within the Community.
14. The principle of territoriality applies even stronger among Member States after the
recent ECJ decisions GAT v. Luk and Roche v. Primus, ruling that cross-border injunctions
are not available in patent infringement actions. See Case C-4/03, GAT v. Luk, 2006 E.C.R.
I-6509, Case C-539/03, Roche v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535.
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of goods and services among member states. Lastly, not even a patent
or copyright misuse doctrine (statutorily or judicially created) is
available as an internal instrument of the IP system, beyond antitrust
16
intervention.
A second landmark difference is the nature of antitrust claims:
17
normally private in the United States,
and likely involving
infringement of IP rights, whereas generally public in the European
18
Union, both at European and national levels. Federal agencies in the
United States undertake only “major” antitrust litigation, such as in the
19
case brought against Microsoft in the nineties, so that public antitrust
enforcement is but a small part of the system. The European
Commission (“Commission”), national antitrust agencies and courts and
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and the Court of First Instance
(“CFI”) have been, so far, the main if not the only watchdog of
15. The only “intellectual property provisions” of the EC Treaty are Articles 30
(formerly 36) and 295 (formerly 222): Article 30 bans restrictions of the free movement of
goods or services or equivalent measures among Member States, except if they are justified,
inter alia, for the protection of “industrial and commercial property.” EC Treaty, supra note
1, art. 30. Article 295 states the Treaty “shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States
governing the system of property ownership.” EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 295. The Treaty
Adopting a European Constitution, signed in Rome October 29, 2004, recognizes IP rights
under different provisions: II-77, III-154, III-176, III-315, III-364; however, the unfortunate
destiny of such Constitution is known, since the Treaty has been ratified only by a minority of
Member States. EUR. CONST. arts. II-77, III-154, III-176, III-315, III-364.
16. But see, the discussion on antitrust liability for acts exceeding the scope of IP rights.
AstraZeneca might also be considered a case of patent misuse scrutinized under antitrust law.
Commission Decision 2005/175, in COMP/A.37.507/F3, Re AstraZeneca Plc, 2006 5 CMLR 6.
17. Section 15(a) of the Clayton Act permits private parties to sue for injury sustained
as a result of violations of the antitrust laws and to recover treble damages and their attorney
fees if they win. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, and the Clayton
Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26, provide for injunctive relief.
18. To this purpose, see the Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC
antitrust rules and related Staff Working Paper which aims to widen the debate on private
alternative to the public enforcement of antitrust law, in line with the modernization process
based on Regulation (EC) n. 1/2003. Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (Dec. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/ index_en.html.
It acknowledges that
damages claims for breach of antitrust laws are rare in the Community, due to many reasons,
such as the hindrance of slow judicial proceedings, the difficulty to accomplish the burden of
the proof, and the lack of class action in the most Member States (only a minority have such
actions). Id.
19. The Microsoft saga in the United States ended in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), which partly confirmed and partly overruled the
District Court’s judgment finding monopolization and attempts to monopolize for various
anticompetitive conducts by Microsoft (illegal tying and others) under Sherman Act § 2. Id.
Among such conducts, however, there was no refusal to license IP claim. See KENNETH L.
PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 517 (2005).
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European competition laws.
Consequently, the enforcement of
European competition law is centralized—so that the coherence is more
easily pursued—whereas antitrust laws and policy in the United States
are split amidst different courts (and residual agencies). Moreover,
most private U.S. antitrust cases are settled confidentially among the
20
parties, so that the terms of the agreement cannot be known. In turn,
the differences in the kind of enforcement reflect on important
procedural issues affecting, for example, the burden of proof (plaintiff
21
vis à vis antitrust agencies ), the interests being enforced (public vis à
vis private), and may well determine the final outcome of cases. It may
also affect the consistency and reliability of the comparison, because the
figures of cases compared are not consistent.
Finally, in the United States antitrust claims that involve patents
may end up, depending on the circumstances, before the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, specifically empowered with appellate
22
jurisdiction on patent litigation, whereas no special forum is set up in
the European Union for antitrust claims involving patents or other IP
rights. In fact, the Commission, the CFI and the ECJ deal with both
23
antitrust claims, general and special, involving IP rights. The different
“core business” of the two fora cannot be without meaning for the
20. According to Ilya Segal and Michael Whinston, “in the U.S. . . . there are 10 private
antitrust suits filed for every public one,” and “80% or more of the private suits are settled
[among the parties] on undisclosed terms.” Ilya Segal & Michael Whinston, Public vs. Private
Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey (Stanford L. and Econ. Olin Working Paper No.
335, Dec. 2006) at 1, 14, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952067.
21. The European Commission, like most European national antitrust agencies, is at
the same time prosecutor and judge of antitrust cases, yet subject to the judicial review of the
Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice. Once a case, known ex officio or
through a consumer or competitor complaint, triggers an investigation, the outcome of the
case is almost unlikely in favor of the antitrust defendant. Because the Commission is not
bound to investigate upon any complaint, unlike a civil court, it can evaluate the soundness of
a case before any opening of a probe. Third parties, consumers, or disgruntled competitors
may support the Commission, but the burden of the proof relies on the Commission itself.
22. The U. S. Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, vesting it with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
patent matters, in order to provide uniform application and interpretation of U.S. patent
laws. The Federal Circuit can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other claims, such as
antitrust; however, recent decisions have limited the appellate jurisdiction of this court only
to primary claims arising under the patent laws, not counterclaims (such as antitrust). See
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶ 704d. See also Barry M. Visconte, Comment, A
Bitter Pillow to Swallow: Patent Law, a True Exception to Antitrust Law Schor v. Abbott
Laboratories, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 399, 405, 412, 416 (2006).
23. National “decentralization” is possible, such as in the Italian system, which passes
antitrust claims involving the exercise of some IP rights to the jurisdiction of specialized
courts. Code of Industrial Property, Act 30, art. 134 (2005).
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resolution of conflicts between antitrust and IP, as the analysis below
will show.
II. COMPARING THE ANTITRUST CASE LAW AND POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
As seen above, monopolization rules do not deal directly with
refusals to share intellectual property rights: antitrust liability for those
cases in the European Union and in the United States is solely based on
the judge-made law. Therefore, the analysis of the case law is essential,
while considering the development of the relationship between IP and
antitrust laws from a historical standpoint may account for the reasons
underlying the current outcomes and the rift between the compared
systems.
The starting point for both the European and American experiences
is that, as a matter of principle, IP owners have no duty to share their
intangible assets, unless specific conditions occur and provided no
objective justifications may be relied upon. However, what these
conditions are, how broadly they may derogate from the exclusivity
entailed by IP rights, and what are the relevant justifications, is still a
24
matter of contention, domestically and comparatively.
A. The European Approach
1. The Historical Hostility Towards IP
Historically, in the European experience, IP rights have been viewed
suspiciously, due mainly to the national boundaries of their grant and
25
scope. Accordingly, they have been considered as barriers to entry
restricting the production, partitioning off the common market, and
26
raising prices.
24. For a comparative overview, see Daniel Kanter, IP and Compulsory Licensing on
Both Sides of the Atlantic—an Appropriate Antitrust Remedy or a Cutback on Innovation?, 7
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 351 (2006); Arezzo, supra note 3, at 476-505; Melanie J.
Reichenberger, Note, The Role of Compulsory Licensing in Unilateral Refusals to Deal: Have
the United States and European Approaches Grown Further Apart After IMS?, 31 J. CORP. L.
549 (2006).
25. There are some exceptions, among which are the Community Trade Mark, Council
Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L11) 1 (EC), and the Community Designs, Council Regulation
6/2002, 2002 O.J. (L3) 1 (EC).
26. See Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust:
The European Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 804 (2001). Korah points out that low
attention has been paid to the special function of IP right of rewarding or inducing
investments and to free riding risks. Id. See also Case 24/67, Parke, Davis and Co. v. Probel,
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This view refers especially to early cases, during the sixties and
seventies, when agreements containing provisions on IP rights were
27
assessed in the light of Article 81 EC Treaty and the same IP rights
granted by national laws had to be balanced with the pillars of the
European Community, such as the four freedoms of movement, the
integration of the markets in the Community area, as well as the
competition principles.
28
29
30
Grundig for trademarks, Parke Davis and Centrafarm for
31
patents, and Deutsche Grammophon for copyright, among others,
endorse the original hostility towards IP rights, while laying the
32
foundation of establishing the Community exhaustion principle.

Reese, Beintema-Interpharm & Centrafarm, 1968 E.C.R. 55 [hereinafter Parke Davis].
The national rules relating to the protection of industrial property have not yet been
unified within the community. In the absence of such unification, the national
character of the protection of industrial property and the variations between the
different legislative systems on this subject are capable of creating obstacles both to
the free movement of the patented products and to competition within the common
market.
Id.
27. Art. 81.1 (formerly 85.1) EC Treaty prohibits agreements, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices in so far they have as object or effect an appreciable
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market and may affect trade
between Member States. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 81.1. Article 81.3 allows granting
individual exemption when efficiency gains outweigh anticompetitive effects, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. Id. art. 81.3. The system of “individual
exemption,” currently governed under EC Reg. 1/2003 by a legal exception rule,
complements the system of “block exemption.” Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L1) 1
(EC).
28. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Établissements Consten S.A.R.L. v. Comm‘n, 1966
E.C.R. 299, [hereinafter Grundig].
29. Parke Davis, 1968 E.C.R. 55.
30. Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974
E.C.R. 1147 [hereinafter Centrafarm].
31. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft GmbH v. MetroSB-Großmärkte
GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 478 [hereinafter Deutsche Grammophon].
32. According to the community exhaustion principle, once a product embodying an IP
right is put into the EEA area directly or with the consent of the right owner (through
licensees or distributors), its further circulation cannot be banned (unless justified by limited
exceptions, such as for re-packaging or re-labeling), and parallel imports must be allowed.
This principle is now well settled (unlike the international exhaustion) and forms the basis for
any intellectual property licensing policy in Europe, besides finding statutory recognition in
various provisions at both Community and national level. See TTBER Guidelines,
Commission Notice—Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (C101) 2, at para. 6. In the trademarks context
see Directive 89/104, art. 7, paras. 1, 2, EC Regulation 40/94 at paras 1,2, 1994 O.J. (L11) 1,
art. 13, paras. 1, 2; and for national systems, see Italian Code of Industrial Property, supra
note 23, Act 30/05, art. 5.
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Over the same period, and within the above quoted decisions, the
ECJ took care to supply the distinction between the “existence” or
“grant” of IP rights and the “exercise,” crucial for the subsequent case
law, whereby only the latter can be limited by the application of
competition rules. Other key concepts are those of the “specific subject
matter” of the IP right, intended to identify both the length of the
admissible “derogation” from the principle of free movement of goods
33
and the “improper use” of the IP right.
Relying on these arguments, the ECJ could strike a balance between
Community fundamental tenets with the respect of national IP systems,
34
as required under Article 30 and Article 295 EC Treaty, while laying

33. In Grundig, the ECJ stated that the injunction by the Commission “to refrain from
using rights under national trade-mark law in order to set an obstacle in the way of parallel
imports does not affect the grant of those rights but only limits their exercise to the extent
necessary to give effect to the prohibition under Article 85(1) [now 85(1)],” and it continued
that this Article “does not allow the improper use of rights under any national trade-mark law
in order to frustrate the community’s law on cartels.” Grundig, 1968 E.C.R. 55 (emphasis
added). In Deutsche Grammophon, the ECJ ruled that
the exercise of an industrial property right falls under the prohibition set out in
Article 85(1) [now 81(1)] of the Treaty each time it manifests itself as the subject, the
means or the result of an agreement which, by preventing imports from other
member states of products lawfully distributed there, has as its effect the
partitioning of the market.
Deutsche Grammophon, 1974 E.C.R. 1147 (emphasis added). It continued “it is clear from
Article 36 [now 30] that, although the Treaty does not affect the existence of rights recognized
by the legislation of a member state with regard to industrial and commercial property, the
exercise of such rights may nevertheless fall within the prohibitions laid down by the Treaty”
and “Article 36 [now 30] only admits derogations from the free movement of products in
order to protect industrial and commercial property to the extent to which such derogations
are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific [subject]
matter of such property.” Id. (emphasis added). The ECJ used also powerful expression
when pointing out that the ban of parallel import through private agreements “which could
legitimize the isolation of national markets, would be repugnant to the essential purpose of the
Treaty, which is to unite national markets into a single market.” Id. (emphasis added). In
Centrafarm, the ECJ, besides the distinction between existence versus exercise of IP right
(lawful or not, “depending on the circumstances”), pointed out the specific “subject” matter of
the patent as the
guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the inventor, has the
exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products
and putting them into circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of
licenses to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.
Centrafarm, 1974 E.C.R. 1147 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the ruling established a
ranking between the free movement of goods, deemed as one of the fundamental principles
of the common market, and IP rights, considered as exceptions to it. Id.
34. Article 30 (formerly 36) and Article 295 (formerly 222) are the only provisions
dealing with property and IP within the EC Treaty. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 30, 295.
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2. Antitrust Liability for Refusal to License in “Exceptional
Circumstances” and Essential Facility Argument
Starting from the mid-eighties onwards, the focus of the European
antitrust bodies shifted from the Community exhaustion to the issue of
antitrust liability for unilateral refusals to license IP rights, under Article
82 EC Treaty.
36
37
First in Volvo and then in Renault, the first two cases within this
range, the ECJ had to determine, in a preliminary ruling, whether the
refusal by car manufacturers to license design rights upon spare parts to
independent manufacturers was abusive under Article 86 (now 82) EC
Treaty. The court established that the exercise of an IP right, in form of
refusal to license, does not amount in itself to an abuse of a dominant
position. However, it obiter argued that certain anticompetitive
conducts are possibly anticompetitive: “the arbitrary refusal to supply
spare parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts
at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a
particular model even though many cars of that model are still in

35. Korah, supra note 26, at 805.
If later, [the E.C.J.] should approve of the use being made of an intellectual
property right, it could say that it concerned the existence of the right, and if it
disapproved, for instance, because its exercise would result in absolute territorial
protection, the E.C.J. could decide that it related to exercise and was forbidden.
Id.
36. Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. I-6211 [hereinafter
Volvo]. Volvo was the proprietor in the United Kingdom of registered design in respect of
body panels for motor vehicles. Veng imported the same body panels, manufactured without
authority from Volvo, and marketed them in the United Kingdom. Volvo claimed Veng’s
activity infringed its exclusive rights and refused to license such rights. The national judge
referred to the ECJ for preliminary ruling. The Court said “
The right of the proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties from
manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products incorporating
the design constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right,” so that the
obligation to grant third parties a license “would lead to the proprietor thereof being
deprived of the substance of his exclusive right.
Id.
37. Case 53/87, Cicra e Maxicar v. Renault, 1988 E.C.R. I-6039 [hereinafter Renault].
Similarly to Volvo, here an Italian trade association comprising a number of undertakings
which manufactured and marketed non original bodywork and spare parts for motor vehicle
asked a national judge a declaration against Renault that such activity did not constitute
illegal conduct. Renault counterclaimed for infringement and national court referred to the
ECJ for preliminary ruling. Id.

14 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1
38

circulation.”
39
Only ten years later, in the mid-nineties, the ECJ issued Magill, the
leading case on refusal to license IP rights, which laid down the
“exceptional circumstances” doctrine.
The factual elements of Magill are well known: RTE, ITV and BBC
were three television stations operating within the Community that
published their guide, each covering exclusively its own programs,
40
protected under copyright.
Magill attempted to publish a
comprehensive weekly television guide, in competition with separate
guides published by each station, but was prevented from doing so by
41
Magill lodged a complaint with the
the three copyright owners.
Commission, which deemed the refusal as an abuse of dominant
42
position and ordered a compulsory license of copyright on TV listings.
43
Both the CFI and the ECJ upheld the Decision.
Although confirming the Volvo rule (i.e., a refusal to license IP is
not in itself an abuse of dominant position), in Magill the ECJ shared
the Commission’s view that the concrete exercise of IP rights presented
“exceptional circumstances” for which it was abusive, because: (a) the
dominant firms’ refusal to provide basic information in the upstream
market impeded the emergence of a new product in a downstream
44
market for which a potential demand existed; (b) there was no
45
justification for such a refusal; and (c) by their conduct, the appellants
38. Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. I-6211.
39. Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743
[hereinafter Magill]. The same special circumstances argument is used in Case T-198/98,
Micro-Leader Business v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-3989, although the case regards
international exhaustion principle (rejected).
40. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743.
41. Id.
42. Commission Decision 89/205/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L78) 43.
43. Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. II-485 [hereinafter
RTE]; Case T-76/89; ITP v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. II-575. In the ITP judgment, the CFI
suggested that in the case the rights encompassed within the copyright on TV listings were
not exercised consistently with their “specific subject matter,” aimed to protect the exclusive
right to reproduce the work, and “essential function,” addressed to protect the moral right in
the work and ensure a reward for the creative effort. It also argued for a primacy of
principles as fundamental as those of the free movement of goods and freedom of
competition, prevailed over any use of a national IP law in a manner contrary to those
principles. ITP, 1991 E.C.R. II-575.
44. The refusal to provide basic information by relying on national copyright
provisions was deemed as abusive because it “prevented the appearance of a new product, a
comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the appellants did not offer
and for which there was a potential consumer demand.” Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743.
45. No justifications were found “either in the activity of television broadcasting or in
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46

reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly television
guides by excluding all competition on that market, because they denied
access to the basic information which was the raw material for the
47
compilation of such a guide.
Interestingly, both the CFI and ECJ dismissed the argument of one
of the appellants (RTE), relying on the inconsistency of the
Commission’s compulsory license with the exclusivity entailed upon the
TV programs by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, yet not on the merits, but only because the
48
Convention was deemed not applicable to the case under appeal.
49
50
Almost a decade later, the ECJ issued the controversial IMS
decision. IMS Health tracked sales of pharmaceutical products in
Germany and to this purpose it created, in cooperation with the
pharmaceutical industry, a structure consisting of 1,860 bricks. This
structure became the industry standard, although protected as a
database under the German copyright law. A competitor tried to
market a competing product using an alternative structure, but due to

that of publishing television magazines.” Id.
46. The need that the owner of the essential input is present directly or indirectly on
the neighbor market of the applicant is not always clear in the community case law. See
Marco Ricolfi, Diritto D’autore ed Abuso di Posizione Dominante, I RIVISTA DIRITTO
INDUSTRIALE 149, 172-184 (2001).
47. The conduct was seen as likely to exclude all competition in the downstream
market. Also relevant is the complete foreclosure of the market, referred not only to by
Magill, resulting from the appellants’ reliance on copyright conferred by national legislation.
Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743. With regard to the likely effect of conduct on trade between
member states, the Court confirmed the settled principle for which an actual effect is not
necessary, being “sufficient to establish that the conduct is capable of having such an effect.”
Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. RTE argued that the compulsory license conflicted with the normal
exploitation of its copyright in the program listings and seriously prejudiced its legitimate
interests; RTE also claimed that that Berne Convention, Article 9(1) and (2) “only allows for
exceptions from authors’ exclusive rights of reproduction to be made by legislation, in special
cases.” See id. The Court found that the Community is not a party of this Convention and
Ireland and that the UK cannot rely on it and considered the time and circumstances of the
case. See id.
49. Meanwhile, in Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. II-923,
the objection was the refusal by French companies and their sole German licensee to give
Tiercé Ladbroke, a Belgian broadcasting company, the license to broadcast in Belgium
televised pictures and sound commentaries on horse races organized in France. The CFI
established that this refusal was not abusive because the French companies were not present
in the market where the applicant wanted to use the requested license, while the same
applicant already operated there, i.e. the license was not essential. Id.
50. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039
[hereinafter IMS].

16 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1

reticence showed by potential clients in using this alternative standard,
it decided to use a structure very similar to that used by IMS. This
decision gave rise to a judicial battle at the national (Germany) and
51
Community level. The ECJ had to decide whether the refusal by IMS
to license the IP protected 1,860 brick structure was abusive since it was
indispensable to operate in the downstream market.
IMS was the occasion for the ECJ to clarify that, according to the
case law, for unilateral refusals to license copyright to be considered as
abusive, “it is sufficient that three cumulative conditions be satisfied,
namely, that refusal is preventing the emergence of a new product for
which there is a potential consumer demand, that it is unjustified and
52
such as to exclude any competition on a secondary market,” whereby
this market was deemed to be also “potential” or “hypothetical” or
53
merely consisting of two different stages of production.
Remarkably, the court stated as sufficient, not necessary, that the
three conditions exist, although when it is so they must be cumulative.
Moreover, it apparently mitigated the new product test, qualifying the
refusal as being abusive “only where the undertaking which requested
the license does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the
goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the owner
54
of the IP right.” It might be argued that the term essentially allows
some kind of duplication by the newcomer, although it is ambiguous to
55
what extent. Conclusively, the court did not adjudicate on this point,
51. The multi-tiered litigation between IMS and NDC is representative of the
functioning of the enforcement system in Europe. IMS sued NDC and PII before a German
court claiming infringement of its 1,860 brick structure and it was granted injunction against
the infringement, confirmed upon two instances of appeal. Id. Yet, the last court referred to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on whether IMS’ refusal to allow NDC to use its 1,860 brick
structure was an infringement of article 82 of the EC Treaty. Id. Meanwhile, NDC lodged a
complaint with the European Commission, which found the IMS’ conduct as abusive and
issued a compulsory licensing order, in form of an interim measure, in favor of all
undertakings present on the market for the provision of German regional sales data.
Commission Decision 2002/165, NDC Health v. IMS Health, 2002 O.J. (L59). The
Commission’s measure was then quashed by the President of the CFI. Case T-184/01R, IMS
Health v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-3193. And the annulment was confirmed in appeal by the
President of the ECJ. Case C-481/01, P(R) NDC Health Corp. v. IMS Health Inc. and
Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. I-3401. Following the CFI judgments and in the light of the reference
made by the German court to the ECJ, the Commission withdrew its Decision 2002/165.
Commission Decision 2003/741, NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim measures, 2003 O.J.
(L268) 69 (EC).
52. IMS, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The Court did not use the same term in the balancing test:
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but it left it to the referring national court to decide the existence of the
56
listed conditions. IMS expressly applied the Magill and Bronner
rulings.
Even without involving IP, Bronner plays an important role in the
case law on unilateral refusal to license IP, in that it unveiled and
refined the European paradigm on the essential facility (“EF”),
previously applied in Magill, although the words “essential facility”
were never spoken by the Commission or the ECJ within these
57
decisions.
In Bronner, Mediaprint, an Austrian publisher with a large share of
the daily newspaper market, operated the only nationwide newspaper
home-delivery scheme in that Member State, consisting of delivering the
newspapers directly to subscribers in the early hours of the morning.
Mediaprint refused to allow Oscar Bronner, publisher of a rival
newspaper, access to that scheme for an appropriate remuneration.

in the balancing of the interest in protection of the intellectual property right and
the economic freedom of its owner against the interest in protection of free
competition, the latter can prevail only where refusal to grant a license prevents the
development of the secondary market to the detriment of consumers.
Id.
56. Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791
[hereinafter Bronner].
57. The underlying principle that dominant firms have a duty to grant access to their
essential facilities, at non discriminatory conditions, has been used especially for physical
properties, in sectors interested by situation of legal monopoly, such as telecommunication,
transport, and energy. Over the years, the EF argument has taken the role of a general
principle of European competition law, both at community and national level, in order to
introduce or reinforce the competition in (downstream or connected) markets whose
competitive dynamic could be conditioned by the dominant firm. Yet the CFI and ECJ have
never named explicitly the EF doctrine in antitrust cases involving IP rights, while rarely they
use the name in other cases. See Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris v. Comm’n, E.C.R. 2000
II-3929; Joined Cases T-374, 375, 384 & 388/94, European Night Services Ltd (ENS) and
others v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141 Case 311/84, Centre Belge D’études de. MarchéTélémarketing v. SA Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion, 1985 E.C.R. 3261
[hereinafter CBEM]. The Commission recalled the EF in some cases during the nineties,
such as Commission Decision 94/19 (EC), see Container v. Stena / Sealink, 1994 O.J. (L15) 8,
and most recently in Commission Decision 2004/33, GVG / FS, 2004 O.J. (L11) 17 (EC), in
which the Commission found that Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), the Italian national railway
company, abused its dominant position because it prevented GVG, a small German railway
company, from providing rolling stock and tracks for an international rail passenger transport
service between Basle and Milan. See GVG/FS 2004 O.J. (L11) 17. See also M. Siragusa &
M. Beretta, La Dottrina Delle Essential Facilities nel Diritto Comunitario e Italiano Della
Concorrenza, in CONTRATTO E IMPRESA/EUROPA 260, (1999). On the scarce fortune of this
doctrine in the United States and for a comparative perspective, see A. Stratakis,
Comparative Analysis of the US and EU Approach and Enforcement of the Essential Facilities
Doctrine, 27 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 434 (2006).
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Oscar Bronner lodged a complaint with the national antitrust court,
which referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
This refusal did not trigger any antitrust liability upon Mediaprint,
because the scheme was deemed not essential for the claimant
publisher, since other methods of newspaper distribution were available,
and thus the refusal was not likely to eliminate all competition on the
part of the person requesting the service.
The ECJ came to this conclusion mostly by relying on Magill. It
argued that, for the Magill judgment to be effectively relied upon, in
order to plead the existence of an abuse of dominant position with
reference to “the exercise of “any property right whatever” –i.e. not only
IP– it would still be necessary that: (a) the refusal of the upstream input
is “likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on
the part of the person requesting in the downstream market; (b) the
refusal is unjustified; (c) the input is indispensable for the lack of any
58
“actual or potential substitute.” As stated above, in Bronner this latter
condition, the indispensability of the input, was not met, but the
decision had the effect of expanding the IP right-based case law to all
refusals to share “whatever” asset, as long as it is essential.
59
60
Conversely, Commercial Solvents and CBEM, cases of refusals to
supply products and services respectively, were also recalled. The court
reminded that ordinary refusals by dominant undertakings to supply
“raw materials and services respectively, which were indispensable to
carrying on the rival’s business, . . . [were considered as abusive] to the
extent that the conduct in question was likely to eliminate all
61
competition on the part of that [rival] undertaking.”
Lastly, just one month before the IMS decision the Commission
ruled on Microsoft, the hottest and most controversial European
62
decision later confirmed by the CFI, ordering the American company
58. Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791.
59. Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Fisioterapico Italiano s.p.a. and
Commercial Solvents v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 223 [hereinafter Commercial Solvents]. The
case concerned a firm controlling the supply of raw material, which integrated downstream in
the derivative product market and cut supply of the raw material to its customers. Id.
60. CBEM, 1985 E.C.R. 3261. Here the dominant firm (a TV broadcasting company)
integrated downstream, with the effect of excluding a downstream competitor, a firm offering
its telemarketing services on television, which was considered an ancillary activity on a
neighboring but separate market. Id.
61. Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791 (citations omitted).
62. Commission Decision 2007/53, COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, 2007 O.J. (L32). 23
(EC) [hereinafter Microsoft]. The CFI adopted its opinion, which confirmed the view taken
th
by the Commission, on September 17 , 2007 (not yet reported, but see the full text at
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to share with its competitors the interoperability information on its
Windows operating system for PC clients in order to allow them to
access the market of small intranet systems, regardless of the IP
protection on the information and despite the fact the new product
requirement was not met. The alternative standard used was the
“incentives balancing test” (i.e., the balance between the possible
negative impact of the compulsory order on Microsoft’s incentives to
innovate and its positive impact on the level of innovation of the whole
63
industry), which led to the compulsory licensing order.
Note that none of the refusal to license IP cases dealt with by the
ECJ, the CFI, and the Commission refers to patents; this is a big
difference from the U.S. experience, as seen below. Rather, the IP
rights time after time at issue have been design, copyright, database,
software and trade secret protection, to some extent more trivial or
lower-protected assets than patents. Indeed, the only compulsory
licenses ordered by the Commission and upheld on appeal involved an
odd national copyright upon basic information, without any creative
added-value, and interoperability information for operating systems.
While this shows the scarce sympathy by European bodies for the
64
exorbitant (weak or bad or utilitarian ) IP rights, it poses the question
whether antitrust intervention is the most appropriate instrument to
deal with it.
Moreover, when the Commission and the ECJ had to decide
whether they are empowered to apply patent laws and to determine the
validity and the scope of patents for the purpose of applying
competition law, they properly declined to do so. For example, in
65
Windsurfing, a case of patent tying through licensing agreements, the
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=T201/04), coinciding with the time of proofreading; for that reason, the CFI decision can only
be mentioned here. The same attempt of bypassing the new product test was done by the
Commission in the compulsory license imposed upon IMS, but the order was quashed in
appeal. See Case T-184/01, R IMS Health v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-3193, See also Arezzo,
supra note 3, at 490-93. At the national level, the Italian Competition Authority issued a
compulsory license order toward Merck beyond the new product requirement. See Rita Coco
& Paolisa Nebbia, Compulsory Licensing and Interim Measures in Merck: A Case for Italy or
for Antitrust Law?, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 452 (2007).
63. Coco & Nebbia, supra note 62, at 458.
64. In this latest sense, the copyright protection upon the content, instead of only upon
the form, of the TV listings and the consequent extension of the legal monopoly downstream
(for all derivatives) explains the antitrust corrective adopted in this case. Ricolfi, supra note
46, at 174.
65. Case 193/83, Windsurfing Int’l Inc. v. Comm’n, 1986 E.C.R. 611 [hereinafter
Windsurfing].
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ECJ held that, although the Commission is not competent to determine
the scope of a German patent, “it may not refrain from all action when
66
the scope is relevant” in order to enforce competition law.
Nonetheless, this flaw of the system did not prevent the Commission
and the courts from including among the tests for antitrust liability the
scope or the essential function of IP rights time by time at stake.
To sum up, the European jurisprudence on refusals to license IP is
inextricably sealed with the EF doctrine, which in turn can be seen as a
specific development of the refusal to deal case law, and it suffers its
67
same shortcomings.
3. The 2005 Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the
EC Treaty
68

The recent Commission’s Discussion Paper
concerning
exclusionary abuses of dominant position has a specific section
addressed to the refusal to license IP rights, largely influenced by the
69
modern pro-Chicago bent.
70
Drafted in the style of non-binding guidelines, it lays down two
general principles to consider in abuses of dominant position: from the
one side the protection of competition, and not of competitors as the
means of enhancing consumer welfare and to avoid competition

66. Id. The Court yet specified that such assessment by the Commission does not preempt any determinations made later by the national courts in actions brought before them.
In the Commission Decision 79/86/EEC, IV/c-29.290 Vaessen/Moris, 1979 O.J. (L19) 32, even
the patent at issue, a patent tying through licensing agreements, was contested among the
parties, but the Commission “presumed” the patent to be valid for the purpose of the
proceeding, while it left the matter to be settled by the national courts. Id.
67. It is not easy to identify the applicable standards for refusal to deal under Article
82 EC Treaty, also due to the lack of a coherent theory of precedent in the European
common law. See Case T-162/ 94, NMB-Minebea, NMB UK and Italia v. Comm’n, 1996
E.C.R. I-427; AG La Pergola in Case C-262/96, Sema Sürül v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1998
E.C.R. I-2685, 2698; Case C-94/04, Cipolla v. Portolese (Poiares Maduro, AG); Case C202/04, Macrino, Capodarte v. Meloni, 2006 E.C.R. I-11421.
68. The DG Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
Exclusionary Abuses, issued in December 2005, triggered a public consultation on the
application of Article 82. DG Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty
to Exclusionary Abuses (Dec. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ competition/anti
trust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf [hereinafter DG Discussion Paper] The purpose of the debate
is to build up sound legal and economic framework envisaged to a wiser application of Article
82. The most important topics raised by the replies to the DG Discussion Paper were
discussed in a public hearing in June 2006. See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
antitrust/art82/ index.html (last visited Oct. 14 2007).
69. DG Discussion Paper, supra note 68, at paras. 237-240. See also id. at paras. 207-42.
70. Id. at para. 7.
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72

harms; on the other side, the efficiency defense, complemented with
73
rules on the allocation of the burden of proof.
At odds, the DG Discussion Paper draws up a distinction between
unjustified termination of existing supply relationships and unjustified
74
refusal to start supplying an input; the main difference between them
71. Id. at para. 54.
The essential objective of Article 82 when analysing exclusionary conduct is the
protection of competition on the market as means of enhancing consumer welfare
and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. The concern is to prevent
exclusionary conduct of the dominant firm which is likely to limit the remaining
competitive constraints on the dominant company, including entry of newcomers, so
as to avoid that consumers are harmed. This means that it is competition, and not
competitors as such, that is to be protected.
Id. at para. 54. Article 82 does not protect
competitors from dominant firms’ genuine competition based on factors such as
higher quality, novel products, opportune innovation or otherwise better
performance, but to ensure that these competitors are also able to expand in or
enter the market and compete therein on the merits, without facing competition
conditions which are distorted or impaired by the dominant firm.
Id. “[T]he central concern of Article 82 with regard to exclusionary abuses is thus foreclosure
that hinders competition and thereby harms consumers.” Id. at para. 55.
72. In this sense, “if the conduct of a dominant company generates efficiencies and
provided that all the other conditions of Article 81(3) are satisfied . . . such conduct should
not be classified as an abuse.” Id. at para. 8.
73. Id. at para. 60.
Where a certain exclusionary conduct is clearly not competition on the merits, in
particular conduct which clearly creates no efficiencies and which only raises
obstacles to residual competition, such conduct is presumed to be an abuse.
However, the dominant company will have the possibility to rebut that presumption.
Such rebuttal can be brought by providing convincing evidence that the conduct
does not and will not have the alleged likely exclusionary effect, or that the conduct
is objectively justified.
Id.
The dominant company may be able to show that the conduct concerned is
objectively necessary, for instance because of reasons of safety or health related to
the dangerous nature of the product in question. Such necessity must be based on
objective factors that apply in general for all undertakings in the market. On the
basis of these factors the dominant company must be able to show that without the
conduct the products concerned cannot or will not be produced or distributed in that
market. In these situations the Community Courts apply strictly the condition of
indispensability. It is considered not the task of a dominant company to take steps
on its own initiative to eliminate products which it regards, rightly or wrongly, as
dangerous or inferior to its own product.
Id. at para. 80.
74. A “termination of a supply relationship” is “normally” considered abusive under a
four-part test: (1) the behavior is a proper termination; (2) “the refusing undertaking is
dominant; (3) the refusal is likely to have a negative effect on competition; and (4) the refusal
is not justified objectively of by efficiencies.” Id. at paras. 218-24. For a refusal to start
supplying to be considered abusive, “normally” a five-part test applies: “(i) the behavior can
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being the indispensability of the input, required additionally for the
latter. Refusal to license IP rights is embedded in the “refusal to start”
supplying an input. Whether this means that terminations to supply
indispensable inputs should be assessed under the lower standard is not
clear.
Section 9 of the Paper considers refusal to license IP rights as one of
the exclusionary practices qualified as “vertical foreclosure,” which
occur when “a dominant company denies a buyer access to an input in
order to exclude that buyer from participating in an economic
75
activity”; competition problems arise when the excluded buyer is also a
rival to the dominant company in the economic activity for which the
input is needed. “As a result, [the competitor] is either driven out of the
market, marginalized or prevented from entering the market. For a
refusal to supply to be abusive, it must, however, have a likely
anticompetitive effect on the market which is detrimental to consumer
76
welfare.” A distinction between an upstream market (“for access to
the input”) and a downstream market (“for which the input is needed in
order to manufacture a product or provide a service”) is stated as
77
useful.
Going through the special regime, the DG Discussion Paper limits
itself to summarize the case law seen above: a refusal to license IP can
be considered as abusive “only in exceptional circumstances,” when the
“five conditions [for standard refusal to supply] are all fulfilled and,
78
furthermore, the refusal to grant a license prevents the development of
the market for which the license is an indispensable input, to the
79
detriment of consumers.”
The DG Discussion Paper goes on to clarify that the rule applies
80
only provided that (“[t]his may only be the case” ) the applicant does
not limit itself “essentially to duplicate the goods or services already
be properly characterized as a refusal to supply; (ii) the refusing undertaking is dominant; (iii)
the input is indispensable; (iv) the refusal is likely to have a negative effect on competition;
and (v) the refusal is not objectively justified.” Id. at para. 224. For the likely market
distorting effect, see id. at paras. 231-33. When a dominant firm wants to defend from an
alleged abuse for refusal to deal, it has to show and prove that consumers are better off with
the supply refused or terminated. Id. at para. 234.
75. Id. at para. 209.
76. Id. at para. 210.
77. Id. at para. 212.
78. See id. at para. 237. “In the case of a refusal to license an IPR an additional
condition may have to be met.” Id.
79. Id. para. 239.
80. Id.
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offered [by the IPR owner,] but intends to produce new good or services
not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a potential
81
consumer demand.” These standards clearly echo the Magill, Bronner
and IMS rulings.
The DG Discussion Paper also identifies the rationale for requiring
additional conditions and exceptional circumstances to limit IP rights:
the special protection provided thereof would be “eroded” if a
successful IP right holder would be required to grant a license to
competitors, and imposing the obligation to grant a license for the
supply of products incorporating the IP right would lead “to the holder
82
being deprived of the substance of the exclusive right.”
Notably, according to the DG Discussion Paper, the new product
requirement does not apply to refusals to license “protected technology
83
which is indispensable as a basis for follow-up innovation”; and a lower
standard applies to leveraging market power through refusal to grant
84
access to interoperability information and to aftermarkets, both
distinct from the standards for refusal to start supplying indispensable
85
inputs and terminate existing relationships. With these special cases,

81. Id.
82. Id. at para. 238.
There is no general obligation for the IPR holder to license the IPR, not even where
the holder acquires a dominant position in the technology or product market. The
very aim of the exclusive right is to prevent third parties from applying the IPR to
produce and distribute products without the consent of the holder of the rights. This
protection would be eroded if the holder of a successful IPR would be required to
grant a licence to competitors from the moment the IPR or the product
incorporating the IPR becomes dominant in the market. Imposing on the holder of
the rights the obligation to grant to third parties a licence for the supply of products
incorporating the IPR, even in return for a reasonable royalty, would lead to the
holder being deprived of the substance of the exclusive right.
Id.
83. Id. at para. 240. This point may turn out to be very controversial, should the
thought of Ricolfi, for whom the exclusive rights upon technological creation should extend
to equivalent and dependent innovations, be shared. Ricolfi, supra note 46, at 158.
84. DG Discussion Paper, supra note 68, at paras. 241-42. “Leveraging market power
from one market to another by refusing interoperability information may be abusive” and
“[e]ven when the IP right to rely upon is a trade secret it may not be appropriate to apply to
such refusals to supply information the same high standards for intervention as those
described in the previous subsection.” Id. at para. 242. It can be named as the “Microsoft
rule.”
85. Id. at paras. 247-65. This part grounds the presumption that it is abusive for a
“dominant company to reserve the aftermarket for itself by excluding competitors from the
market,” and this is either for tying or refusal to deal, such as a “refusal to supply information
needed to provide products or services in the aftermarket; a refusal to license intellectual
property rights; or a refusal to supply spare parts needed in order to provide aftermarkets
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the Commission confirmed its attempt to go further than the check list
of Magill and IMS, at least for selected purposes (for example bypassing
the new product/market test, as already done in IMS compulsory license
86
and Microsoft decision ).
87
Lastly, the DG Discussion Paper also contains a balancing test
intended improperly to suggest to the Commission, to national agencies,
88
and to courts, a micromanagement approach to IP rights, not viable in
practice and almost ineffective, if not awkward.
B. The American Approach
1. The Cycles of Antitrust Applied to Intellectual Property
As effectively noted, in the United States the conflict between
antitrust law and IP rights “has ebbed and flowered over time, often
moving in cycles depending to some extent upon the philosophies of the
89
incumbent policy makers.”
services.” Id. at para. 264.
86. See supra, notes 51 and 62.
87. See DG Discussion Paper, supra note 68, at paras. 234-36. To take into account the
risks of failure and sunk investments when assessing a refusal to supply an indispensable
input, which brings to keep a “lead time,” i.e., a period of exemption where no abuse would
be found, even when this eliminates effective competition. See id. at para. 236. In refusal to
deal cases, it is possible to evaluate ex post facto whether the dominant firm would have made
the investment had it known at the time that a duty to deal would be imposed. Investments
behind innovations leading to intellectual property rights are specifically considered, when
they “may not have been particularly significant, in which case it may be likely that the
investment would have been made even knowing that a duty to supply would be imposed.”
“In making such assessment, the Commission will take account of the respective values that
are at stake, including the possible effects on incentives to follow-on investment from
allowing access.” See id. at para. 237.
88. See Derek Ridyard, Compulsory Access under EC Competition Law—A New
Doctrine of “Convenient Facilities” and the Case for Price Regulation, 2004 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 669, 671.
[T]he Commission [. . .] appears to have departed from the ‘last resort’ intervention
philosophy of the essential facilities cases, and has instead adopted a
micromanagement approach, whereby the competition authority is presumed to
have the ability to identify the right balance between the benefits of creating
incentives for winners, and the benefits of competitive rivalry. No one can say
definitively that this is wrong as matter of economic or industrial policy, but one
must wonder whether the Commission is really capable of making this key
judgment.
Id.
89. Ilene Knable Gotts & Howard W. Fogt, Jr., Clinton Administration Expresses More
Than Intellectual Curiosity in Antitrust Issues Raised by Intellectual Property Licensing, 22
AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1994), reported in KENNETH. L. PORT ET AL. LICENSING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 473 (2005). For these authors, a distinction between
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The modern endorsement of a benign attitude, also inflated by the
economic theories of the Chicago School, is reflected in this area by the
DOJ-FTC Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
90
(“Antitrust-IP Guidelines”).
They embed the rule of reason, as
opposed to per se rule, and presume that pro-competitive effects arise
from IP licensing, while rejecting the notion that IP rights create market
91
Moreover, focusing on the possible
power for antitrust purposes.
anticompetitive use of IP, they exclude that “market power imposes on
the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of that
92
property to others.” Symmetrically, licensing arrangements involving
exclusivity can encourage licensees to invest in the products embodying
93
the licensed IP and to engage in follow-on innovation.
Finally, the Antitrust-IP Guidelines clarify that, “[a]s with any other
tangible or intangible asset that enables its owner to obtain significant
supra-competitive profits, market power or (even monopoly) that is
solely the ‘consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
94
historic accident,’ does not violate [per se] antitrust laws.”
Similarly, as shown below, more recent documents issued by the
same Agencies encompass an open approach towards IP. Yet it is the
case law that has primarily shaped the refusal-to-license-IP law.
three periods can be drawn up: the first one, roughly from 1914 to 1940, was “a period of
benign antitrust enforcement,” when the government encouraged the formation of cartels as
a way to move away from the great depression; in the second one, during the post World War
II modernization, cartels were vigorously attacked through a rigid application of the per se
rule and conducts of IP rights holders were viewed suspiciously (this is the era of the “Nine
No-Nos” by the DOJ); the third one started “approximately in 1980 and reached its peak
during the Reagan and [first] Bush administration,” with a benign attitude towards firms’
freedom of action. Id.
90. DOJ AND FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (April 6, 1995), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13, 132 (1995)
[hereinafter ANTITRUST-IP GUIDELINES].
91. Id. § 5.3, which states that “the Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright,
or trade secret necessarily confers market power on its owner” when assessing tying
agreements. Id. § 5.3. In the same sense, now Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc. overruled a long standing presumption that patent equals market power. 547 U.S. 28, 31
(2006).
92. ANTITRUST-IP GUIDELINES, supra note 90, § 2.2 (“[a]s in other antitrust contexts,
however, market power could be illegally acquired or maintained, or, even if lawfully
acquired and maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual property owner to
harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection with such property.”)
93. Id. § 2.3.
94. Id. § 2.2 (quoting U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966)). See also United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d. Cir. 1945) (holding that the
Sherman Act is not violated by the attainment of market power solely through “superior skill,
foresight and industry”).
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2. IP Rights as Shield from Antitrust, but a Shifting Test Applies to
Patents
Tracing the development of the American case law is not an easy
task. This scenario is much more scattered than the European one, with
dozens of cases having been assessed. The courts’ progression is not
straight: different courts have granted IP owners diverse degrees of
immunity from antitrust enforcement, ranging from absolute immunity
95
to the denial of any immunity whatsoever, although with a clear bias in
96
favor of IP. Reviewing significant cases may help to shed light on the
97
matter, but the final outcome is not easy to figure out.
98
99
To start with Supreme Court cases, Aspen and Trinko must be
recalled because, although not IP related, they highly condition the
refusal to license IP jurisprudence.
100
At the outset, as a matter of principle under the Colgate rule, no
one has a duty to share his or her assets with third parties and to deal or
cooperate with competitors. Yet the right to refuse to deal is not
unqualified: it may face limits in some circumstances, such as those that
occurred in Aspen. In this famous case, an all-Aspen ski ticket—valid at
any mountain in Aspen—had been developed and jointly marketed
when the three (later four) areas in Aspen were owned by independent

95. See M.A. Carrier, Refusal to License Intellectual Property After Trinko, 55 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1191, 1199 (2006).
96. Authoritative scholars support these options. “[B]oth patent and antitrust policy
provide formidable reasons against compulsory licensing of intellectual property rights
against a firm whose only offence is the refusal to license itself.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 8, ¶ 709a. These authors then divide unilateral refusals to license into two groups:
(1) simple or unconditional refusals, which are virtually never an antitrust violation (“and the
reasoning of the tiny handful of courts that have thought otherwise cannot withstand
scrutiny”) and (2) conditional refusal to license, nearly always assessed under antitrust
provisions other than the Sherman Act § 2 , such as tying and exclusive dealing. Id. See also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 13
(2002) (discussing antitrust concerns related to conglomerate mergers).
97. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Unilateral Refusal to
License in the US, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 12
(François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds. 2005).
98. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
[hereinafter Aspen].
99. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004) [hereinafter Trinko].
100. In United States v. Colgate & Co., the Supreme Court held that, in“[i]n the
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not
restrict the . . . right of a trader or manufacturer . . . freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.” 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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entities. Some time after, Aspen Skiing Company gained control of
three of the four ski areas, and it refused to continue a joint agreement
with the other competitor, owner of the fourth area. Although the EF
doctrine was not involved, the court found that it was exclusionary for
Aspen Skiing Company, as a monopolist, to refuse to continue a
presumably efficient pattern of distribution that had originated in a
competitive market and had persisted for several years. The Supreme
Court affirmed the liability of the dominant firm under a refusal to deal
theory based on § 2 of the Sherman Act and found it “unnecessary to
consider the possible relevance of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine . . .
101
.”
In the other famous case, Trinko, the Court attacked the
102
controversial EF doctrine
(“[w]e have never recognized such a
doctrine . . . , and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate
103
104
it here”) even though it was not a genuine case of EF.
Here, a
consumer—a New York City law firm—filed a class action suit against
Verizon, the incumbent local telephone company acting also as local
exchange carrier (LEC), for its delays in carrying on certain actions
(processing orders) required for the supply of telecommunication

101. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.
102. The EF (or “bottleneck”) exception to the rule “no share obligation” was created
in the United States by the Supreme Court with the leading case United States v. Terminal
Railroad Ass’n, in which a group of railroads jointly owned a key bridge over the Mississippi
River and accompanying rail yard for traffic from the West into St. Louis and refused to give
competing railroads use of the facilities. The applied four-part test was: (1) control of the
facility by a monopolist; (2) competitors’ inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the
facility; (3) a refusal to grant the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of
providing the facility, in the absence of any justifications for denying the access. 224 U.S. 383
(1912). The legitimacy of this doctrine has been intensely disputed in the academic and legal
communities for its amenability to being easily used by would-be competitors as a short-cut
method for proving “seeming abuses” of monopoly power. Very critical is Areeda, who
refers to it as the “so-called essential-facility’ facilities doctrine” resulting in “judging by catchphrase” and suggests very restrictive criteria for its application in order to get to the real goals
of antitrust law, i.e., the maximum productive and allocative efficiency. Phillip Areeda,
Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841
(1989) (emphasis added). See also Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to
Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted Journey of the “Essential Facilities” Doctrine, 1996 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 2; Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 97, at 18; AREEDA, &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶ 771 (with specific references to the IP bottleneck and the EF
doctrine).
103. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
104. The EF doctrine has been used expressly by American courts, which along the
years added requirements to the original paradigm. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991);
MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
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services by competing newcomer telephone companies.
Neither
denial of access to indispensable assets nor any refusal to grant access to
106
Then, the form of monopolization
(just useful) assets was involved.
alleged—delays in processing orders needed to get telecommunication
services from newcomers—had already been dealt with and sanctioned
by the bodies in charge of applying the specific discipline of the sector,
107
i.e., the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Thus, it was properly a case
about bad services or, to use the words of the Court, “insufficient
108
assistance in the provision of service to rivals,” while a new discipline
was being implemented. Neither was it a case of refusal to deal or
monopolization. The key element of the case was the relationship
between antitrust and other forms of regulation of the market, far away
from being a refusal to share IP issue.
Nonetheless, the Court used Trinko as a pretext to affirm strong
109
economic-based antitrust policy, as well as a clear disfavor towards the
110
EF doctrine. The Court gave a narrow reading of Aspen, saying it was
only limited to “unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus
presumably profitable) course of dealing” because such unilateral
termination “suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to
111
Notably, the Court also supported
achieve an anticompetitive end.”
its decision by recalling the risks and costs of “false positives” in
112
antitrust enforcement, led case by case, and stating that it has been
“very cautious” in recognizing the exception to the rule of firms’
freedom of action “because of the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and
the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a
113
single firm.”

105. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 398.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 410.
109. Id. The opinion pointed out three reasons why requiring firms to share their
assets is in tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law based on the incentive
argument (“it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those
economically beneficial facilities”), the proper role of antitrust courts (which act as
regulators), and the risk of the supreme evil of antitrust, i.e., collusion. Id. at 408. Also
remarkable is the holding that sometimes the monopoly price is not only justified but positive
for competition. Id. at 412.
110. It concluded that refusal to deal is the rule, and the principle set up in Aspen is the
exception “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.” Id. at 409.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 414.
113. Id. at 408.
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The rejection of the EF doctrine as applied to IP was affirmed even
114
before Trinko in Intel.
Here, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
115
Circuit reversed a compulsory license order to Intel to continue to
supply Intergraph with the existing and future devices, computer
microprocessors (CPUs) and information available, denying they could
116
be deemed as essential facilities.
Intergraph developed and sold computer workstations used in
computer-aided graphics and alleged it could not survive in this highly
competitive business without the products, services, and benefits it had
117
The Federal Circuit quashed the
obtained previously from Intel.
order and rejected the EF argument, finding that Intergraph and Intel
were not competitors either upstream or downstream: namely, it noted
that “essential facility theory does not depart from the need for a
competitive relationship in order to incur Sherman Act liability and
118
remedy.”
Regarding the allegation that Intel used its IP rights (copyright and
patent) in restraint of trade, the Federal Circuit distinguished the case
from refusal to license case law in that Intergraph was seeking a
preferred position, not merely the grant of a license, and declined to
scrutinize Intel’s intent in order to evaluate its behavior, since it
119
considered the intent an imprecise test for antitrust purposes.
As for the residual monopoly leveraging claim, the court declined to
apply the monopoly leveraging theory, since “Intel’s action affected
120
only Intergraph, in a heavily populated competitive market”

114. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Intel].
115. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Al. 1998).
116. Intel, 195 F.3d at 1358.
117. Id. at 1350-51.
118. Id. at 1356. The court adds:
no court has taken [the essential facility theory] beyond the situation of competition
with the controller of the facility, whether the competition is in the field of the
facility itself or in a vertically related market that is controlled by the facility. That
is, there must be a market in which plaintiff and defendant compete, such that a
monopolist extends its monopoly to the downstream market by refusing access to
the facility it controls.
Id. at 1357.
119. Id. at 1362.
120. Id. at 1360. “Absent an adverse effect in the second market, the Sherman Act
would serve to restrain competition rather than promote it.” Id. at 1359. A complementary
relationship between patents and antitrust laws is also affirmed: “the patent system serving to
encourage invention and the bringing of new products to market by adjusting investmentbased risk, and the antitrust laws serving to foster industrial competition. . . . The patent and
antitrust laws serve the public in different ways, both of importance to the nation.” Id. at
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downstream, while the show of tangible harms to competition on the
whole, not only unrelated harms to individual competitors or
consumers, is necessary in these cases.
The argument that the Sherman Act “is a law in the public, not
121
private, interest,” also supports these findings.
122
123
Yet it is the split between Kodak II and Xerox, concerning the
same facts, i.e., a refusal to license patented spare parts to independent
service organizations (ISOs) by producers of equipment and related
spare parts, that is the hottest area of contention.
124
In the earlier Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit found a refusal to
continue to sell patented spare parts for photocopiers to be a
presumptively illegal means of leveraging market power in the
aftermarket under Sherman Act § 2 by heavily relying on the
exclusionary intent of the refusal.
The action was brought by ISOs against Kodak, an equipment
manufacturer, based on the allegation that by disrupting the previous
level of supply, as ISOs grew more competitive, Kodak leveraged its
monopoly power in the market of patented spare parts into the market
for repairing services, where ISOs would be competing with Kodak.
The relevant markets were found to be the single “all parts” markets,
1362.
121. Id. at 1356. Another case in which the judge had to gauge IP with the EF test was
David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corporation, in which the EF doctrine was excluded on
the basis that, at that time, the specific Microsoft operating system was considered not
essential to compete in the downstream market of utility programs. 995 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.
Tex. 1998). See also Arezzo, supra note 3, at 482.
122. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir.
1997) [hereinafter Kodak II]. The case has a long history. It was originally heard by the
Northern District of California, which granted summary judgment for Kodak, then reversed
by the judge of appeal, and lastly dealt with by the Supreme Court, which affirmed the appeal
judgment, and remanded to district court. Upon a jury verdict for ISOs, the district court
granted a permanent injunction. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 451 (1992) [hereinafter Kodak I]. It was assessed as illegal tying under § 1 of the
Sherman Act and monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy under § 2 of the
Sherman Act. Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479, 486. After remand before the trial court, the district
court, which was asked to evaluate only the monopolization and attempt to monopolize
claims, granted a ten year permanent injunction requiring Kodak to sell “all parts” to ISOs at
“reasonable prices.” Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1224, 1226-28. Noteworthy, Kodak I assessed a
tie-in consisting in the sale of equipment parts conditioned on the sale of Kodak’s equipment
services under § 1 Sherman Act as well as “naked” aftermarket monopolization and attempt
to monopolize claims under § 2 Sherman Act but without any patent defense. Kodak I, 504
U.S. at 477, 485-86.
123. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Xerox].
124. Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1195.
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including patented and unpatented parts, respectively, for photocopiers
and for micrographic equipment, whereby Kodak was found to be the
monopolist, no matter that in the primary equipment market Kodak
125
faced strong competition.
The Ninth Circuit held that, although valid intellectual property
rights create a presumption of a legitimate business justification for
anticompetitive conduct, ISOs submitted sufficient proof to reject
Kodak’s business justification, “as the record reflects evidence of
pretext” to mask anticompetitive conduct because the defendant refused
to sell both patented and unpatented parts and was not even thinking
126
about its patent rights when it did so.
However, in rejecting the patent defense, the court recalled two
limits to the exclusivity granted by patent rights, which are (a) unlawful
acquisition through fraud and (b) misuse, i.e., extension of the
monopoly into separate markets. It then added that “Section 2 of the
Sherman Act condemns exclusionary conduct that extends natural
monopolies into separate markets. Much depends, therefore, on the
127
No inquiry
definition of the patent grant and the relevant market.”
though was conducted on the definition of the patent grant.
128
In contrast, in Xerox the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
granted a patentee a near-immunity from Sherman Act § 2. The facts
were very similar to Kodak II and involved Xerox, which manufactured,
sold, and serviced high-volume copiers, and CSU, an ISO. The case
arose because CSU claimed that Xerox, changing its previous supplying
policy, refused to sell patented spare parts and copyrighted manuals and
to license copyrighted software used to serve its equipment copier, in
129
breach of antitrust laws.
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit did not consider
unlawful the refusal to sell patented spare parts because the refusal was
130
deemed within the scope of the IP right, even if actually the court did
not determine what this scope was.

125. Id. at 1226.
126. Id. at 1213. “The ISOs presented evidence that: (1) Kodak adopted its parts
policy only after an ISO won a contract . . ., ; (2) Kodak allowed its own customers to service
their machines; (3) Kodak customers could distinguish breakdowns due to poor service from
breakdowns due to parts; and (4) many customers preferred ISO service.” Id.
127. Id. at 1216.
128. Xerox., 203 F.3d 1322.
129. Id. at 1324.
130. “We answer the threshold question of whether Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented
parts exceeds the scope of the patent grant in the negative.” Id. at 1328.
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Here, the court declined to consider the patentee’s subjective
motivation and to apply the Kodak II test based on “pretext” because
“[t]his logic requires an evaluation of the patentee’s subjective
motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented products,” which
was held not admissible, “even though [the] refusal . . . may have an
anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not
131
illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant.”
The Federal Circuit also distinguished the case from Kodak I, which
applied the monopoly leverage theory, because—it said—this was a case
of illegal tying through unlawful extension of patent monopoly, and no
132
patents had been asserted in defense for the refusal to license claims.
Notably, the immunity granted in Xerox was a near-immunity
because some exceptions were carved out in dictum, e.g., illegal tying,
fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office procedures, or sham
133
litigation.
The applicable law for the issue concerning the patented spare parts
was found to be the Federal Circuit law because it “clearly” involved the
134
exclusive jurisdiction of this court. Yet the outcome was not different,
in the same dispute, the ISO claim referred to the copyrighted manual
and software, which was decided not on the Federal Circuit but rather
135
on Tenth Circuit case law and precedent.
The main precedent recalled in Xerox to assess the copyright claim is
136
Data General. Here, the First Circuit found the refusal to continue to
supply copyrighted software for aftermarket services as presumptively
137
legal because copyright was deemed a valid business justification.
Data General and Grumman were competitors in the supply of
service for computers manufactured by Data General. Grumman was
given the same Data General tools and software for its activity as a third
138
party maintainer (TPM).
Due to the evolving nature of their
relationship (Data General claimed infringement of copyright and
misappropriation of trade secrets by Grumman), Data General
131. Id. at 1327-28.
132. Id. at 1326-27.
133. Id. at 1326.
134. Id. at 1325. For the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit over patent/antitrust cases,
see supra note 22.
135. Id. at 1328.
136. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994)
[hereinafter Data General].
137. Id. at 1187.
138. Id. at 1152-53.
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disrupted its previous practices of supplying Grumman with input
139
necessary to carry on its business.
Beyond the specific facts, interest in the opinion lies in the fact that
it conducted a thorough review of the principles governing unilateral
140
refusal to deal and suggested weighing potential anticompetitive
effects of refusals to license patents and copyrights against the procompetitive effects of both paradigms of protection, especially in the
141
form of countervailing long-term benefits of a strong protection.
As for copyright law, the court argued that Congress “made an
empirical assumption that allowing copyright holders to collect license
fees and exclude others from using their works creates a system of
incentives that promotes consumer welfare in the long term by
encouraging investment in the creation of desirable artistic and
142
functional works of expression.”
The pursued interest was thus not
only the author’s, but also the public’s, and “[w]e cannot require
antitrust defendants to prove and reprove the merits of this legislative
assumption in every case where a refusal to license a copyrighted work
143
comes under attack.”
In the specific case, the court found that Grumman did not present
sufficient proof to rebut this presumption and to support its contention
that Data General “acted in an exclusionary fashion in discontinuing its
144
liberal policies allowing TPM access to diagnostic software.”
Although arguing in favor of distinct balancing standards for patents
and copyrights, Data General largely relied on precedent referring to
patents, so that patent and copyright end up being governed by a
convergent regime, although formally assessed under different rules.
Finally, it must be noted that, if Xerox is certainly not the only
145
judicial patent exception from antitrust, the split between this case
139. Id. at 1153-54.
140. “[W]hile exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist’s . . . refusal to license a
copyright, an author’s desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a
presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers” and “there
may be rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the objectives of
the Copyright Act.” Id. at 1187, 1187 n.64. The “pursuit of efficiency and quality control
might be legitimate competitive reasons for an otherwise exclusionary refusal to deal, while
the desire to maintain a monopoly market share or thwart the entry of competitors would
not.” Id. at 1183.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 1186-87.
143. Id. at 1187.
144. Id. at 1182.
145. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter SCM].
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and Kodak II is not isolated. In fact, it has been recently replicated in
146
two district cases: whereas in Schor v. Abbott Laboratories the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the “naked”
monopolization claim and granted an absolute immunity to the patent
147
owner, in In re Abbott Laboratories Norvir Anti-trust Litigation, the
District Court for the Northern District of California (whose court of
appeals is the Ninth Circuit) held that there was sufficient evidence that
the defendant had abused its patents and monopolized the neighbor
148
market to deny its motion for summary judgment.
To summarize, the clear trend of the U.S. system is towards
shielding IP rights against antitrust. Few exceptions to the immunity
were expressly listed, while a big question mark remains on the
relevance of the intent of the IP owner. On the whole, though, it is
149
difficult to forecast the future of this muddled area of law.
Some scholars have considered Trinko as almost barring antitrust
150
scrutiny upon refusal to share IP. While good arguments support this
conclusion, the specific facts and the legal reasoning in Trinko seem to
not allow strictly to share that view. In any case, the same Trinko
intended to affirm antitrust liability under the “termination rule”
devised in Aspen. A recent report by the DOJ and the FTC deals
specifically with the matter.

According to the Second Circuit, when antitrust and patent law clash, “the primary purpose
of the antitrust laws–to preserve competition–can be frustrated, albeit temporarily, by a
holder’s exercise of the patent’s inherent exclusionary power during its term.” Id. at 1203. In
fact, the court argued, because “[t]he heart of [the patentee’s] legal monopoly is the right to
invoke the State’s power to prevent others from utilizing his discovery without his consent,”
“a patent holder is permitted to maintain his patent monopoly through conduct permissible
under the patent laws.” Id. at 1204 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 135). A diverse conclusion is permitted only when a “patent holder abuses his
patent by attempting to enlarge his monopoly beyond the scope of the patent granted him.”
Id. at 1204. This solution is stated as able to strike “an adequate balance between the patent
and antitrust laws.” Id. at 1206. Otherwise, the court reasons, the efficacy of the patent
system would be seriously undermined by the threat of potential antitrust liability.
146. Schor v. Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2006).
147. In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., 442 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
The principal case is still pending for discovery on fact and a jury verdict.
148. See Rita Coco, Patent Immunity from Antitrust: The Abbott Cases in the United
States., 2007 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 404-500.
149. Remarkably, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Xerox on February 20,
2001. CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 531 U.S. 1143 (2001). And, on February 20, 2007, the
Court also denied certiorari for Schor v. Abbott Labs., giving up on tackling the split between
this case and In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig. 127 S. Ct. 1257 (2007).
150. See Carrier, supra note 95, at 1199.
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3. The 2007 DOJ–FTC Report on Antitrust Enforcement and IP Rights
The DOJ-FTC Report on antitrust enforcement and IP rights (Joint
151
Report),
issued in April 2007, addresses various facets of the
relationship between antitrust and IP, among others the refusal to
license patents (exclusively, not other IP rights), and offers an overview
of the policy the Agencies will likely pursue on the hottest issues within
this area.
152
Similar to the previous Antitrust-IP Guidelines and the FTC
153
report on the balance of competition and patent law and policy, the
154
Joint Report is strongly inspired by economic analysis and supports
the idea that IP and antitrust are complementary and pursue consistent
155
goals.
Very notably, the Joint Report acknowledges that many of the
difficulties the Agencies face “stem from differences between the
characteristics of intellectual property and other forms of property,”
such as greater ease of misappropriation compared with tangible assets,
potentially an infinite number of times without interfering with its
owner, the high fixed cost to create IP rights vis-à-vis the low marginal
cost to use them, the difficulty of determining their exact boundaries,
the dependence of their value on a combination of other factors or
156
The
production or distribution, and finally their limited duration.
151. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
(2007) at 9, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf [hereinafter JOINT
REPORT]. The awareness of the dilemma underlying the IP and antitrust interface, and
“[r]ecognizing that both robust competition and intellectual property rights are crucial to a
well-functioning market economy,” the Agencies conducted a series of Hearings (in which
300 hundred people were heard), beginning in February 2002, collected written comments,
and analyzed the relevant literature, in order to better understand “how best to reward
innovation while encouraging competition.” Id. at 32. This Report is almost entirely
dedicated to licensing practices, with specific focus on hard-core restrictive practices, such as
patent pool, crosslicensing, grantback, etc., but also on Standard Setting Organizations and
tying. It saves expressly the Antitrust-IP Guidelines, which are declared still valid in the
integrity. Id. at 4-5.
152. See ANTITRUST IP GUIDELINES, supra note 90.
153. See TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY. A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
154. “[I]t is well understood that exercise of monopoly power, including the charging
of monopoly prices, through the exercise of a lawfully gained monopoly position will not run
afoul of the antitrust laws. The same principle applies to monopoly power that is based on
intellectual property rights.” JOINT REPORT, supra note 151, at 1-2.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 4. The Agencies stated that, for the purpose of antitrust analysis, they
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Agencies thus state that “[t]he application of antitrust law to intellectual
157
property requires careful attention to these differences.”
“Unilateral refusals to license patents” are assessed as a form of
158
“strategic use of licensing” in Chapter 1 of the Joint Report.
Most
parts of the discussion regard the split between Kodak II and Xerox.
Neither one nor the other are seen, in the light of different panelists’
opinions, as providing sufficient guidance on potential antitrust liability
for unilateral refusal to license patents; moreover, the Joint Report
159
underlines that they create uncertainty for licensors and licensees.
The intent-based test of Kodak II especially attracted a lot of
critiques, as it is considered out of step with modern antitrust law’s focus
on objective economic aspects of conduct, unworkable because it is
inextricably linked with the legitimate intent to protect IP and to create
or maintain monopoly, and very difficult to use as a basis to ensure
160
certainty to business practices. Over this debate, the Agencies stated
that their “focus is upon the effect of [the] conduct, not upon the intent
161
behind it,” although they add “[k]nowledge of intent may help
162
[courts] to interpret facts and to predict consequences.”
In turn, Xerox also had its foes among panelists: while the refusal to
license is acknowledged as an absolute statutory right, the Xerox
approach is blamed for being inconsistent with the trend of antitrust
analysis, which moved away from a rigid formalism “in favor of a factbased analysis that applies rigorous economic principles to distinguish
163
anticompetitive from procompetitive conduct.”
One crucial point is underlined in the Joint Report: the importance
164
of the scope of the patent grant, but also its ambiguity, as shown by
regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any other form of property.
Thus, intellectual property is considered “neither particularly free from scrutiny under the
antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect under them.” ANTITRUST IP GUIDELINES, supra note
90, § 2.1. Nonetheless, they acknowledge that IP has special distinctive characteristics, such as
the ease of misappropriation, that distinguish it from any other forms of property. Id.
157. JOINT REPORT, supra note 151, at 4.
158. Id. at 5.
159. Id. at 16.
160. Id. at 17.
161. Id. at 18 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
162. Id. (citing Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
163. Id. at 19 (citing A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case:
Facts, Formalism and the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 10 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 407, 425 (2002).
164. Chapter 6 of the JOINT REPORT focuses on practices that firms may use to extend
the reach of a patent beyond the expiration of a patent’s statutory term, such as collecting
royalties beyond the statutory term, the use of exclusive contracts that deprive rivals or
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Kodak II and Xerox. It pointed out that these cases show that “the
patent grant is not coterminous with . . . the relevant market, so the right
to exclude may permit a patent holder to maintain a monopoly over not
just the market for the patented parts but possibly also over closely
related markets,” although both cases omitted to define the scope of the
165
patent grant.
Key policy issues relating to unilateral refusals to license are
166
discussed, while the legal analysis that closes the Chapter confronts
two basic issues. The first one is the threshold question of whether the
1988 Congress amendment to the Patent Act, which cut back patent
167
misuse, excluding from its scope the refusal to license, refers directly
to antitrust laws. The answer of the Joint Report is negative:
“immunity from antitrust laws is both exceptional and disfavored. . . .
[Section 271(d)(4)] can perhaps be said to shed some light on Congress’s
view of the nature of the patent right. But the Agencies do not read the
168
statute to create antitrust immunity for such refusals to license.” The
second question is the definitive one, i.e., when refusals to license
patents violate antitrust laws.
After restating that “antitrust liability for refusal to assist
competitors—whether by licensing patents or otherwise—is a rare
169
exception to the ordinary rules of antitrust,” the Joint Report points
out that “refusals to deal are rarely anticompetitive, whether or not they
170
involve patents.”
It also went on significantly: “[Aspen] will not
support liability for unilateral refusals to license patents to rivals,

potential entrants of a source of supply or access to customers, or bundling trade secrets with
patents. Id. at 115-16.
165. Id. at 20.
166. Id. at 20-25. These are (1) whether antitrust should have a special treatment for
patents; (2) whether patents entail per se market power (the issue is overcome after Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), which excluded this possibility);
(3) whether compulsory licensing is an appropriate remedy were an antitrust violation is
found; and (4) the likely effects of liability for refusal to license patents on incentives to
innovate and its competitive effects. Id. On the last issue, one panelist pointed out that at
this kind of marginal refusal to deal liability, doubtful innovation incentives are sufficiently
sensitive so that there should not be any “significant incentive diminution at all.” Id. at 24.
On the other side, another panelist “argued that the ability to exploit an intellectual property
bottleneck may generate important incentives to innovate and cautioned that regulating the
exploitation of intellectual property amounts to regulating the return on R&D investment
and is a very difficult economic exercise.” JOINT REPORT, supra note 151, at 25.
167. Id. at 25. The relevant provision is 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).
168. JOINT REPORT, supra note 151, at 26-27.
169. Id. at 27.
170. Id. at 28.
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except, perhaps, when a patent owner refuses to continue to license
171
This
under circumstances paralleling those presented in Aspen.”
endeavor by the Agencies reflects clearly Trinko’s theories. Other parts
of the Joint Report are in the same direction and likewise quote Trinko
172
For example, after noting that the right
as the applicable precedent.
to exclude is the “essence” of a patent grant, it restated that a long line
of Supreme Court and courts of appeals cases “suggests that exercising
[IP rights] by refusing to license a patent, without more, would not
173
Moreover, none of the Supreme Court
violate the antitrust laws.”
cases squarely holds immunity from antitrust for unilateral refusal to
license patents or that antitrust should be applied differently in IPrelated cases, but the strong statements in these cases are indicative of
the traditional understanding that the unilateral right to decline the
grant of a license is a core part of the patent grant. Prior to Kodak II,
no reported federal antitrust decision had imposed liability for the
refusal to license a patent. Even in the controversial Kodak II case
itself, the outcome might be explained as a result of Kodak’s refusal to
174
sell thousands of unpatented parts.
The conclusion of the Joint Report is thus that “liability for mere
unconditional, unilateral refusals to license will not play a meaningful
part in the interface between patent rights and antitrust protections,”
although “numerous imaginable scenarios [might] involve conduct that
goes beyond a mere refusal to license a patent and could give rise to
antitrust liability,” such as conditional—i.e., contractual or cooperative,
under Sherman Act § 1—refusals to license, which cause “competitive
175
harm.”
Between the two solutions arising from the discussion, i.e., absolute
immunity vis-à-vis refusals assessed on a case-specific, fact-intensive
basis without safe harbor, the Agencies were biased substantially for the
first, endorsing much of the Trinko reasoning while formally escaping
from the debate on Sherman Act § 2 and hiding their position behind
the potential of Sherman Act § 1.
It remains to be seen how this policy will be implemented and to
what extent it will influence the judicial private enforcement of antitrust

171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 29. See id. at 29 n. 106 for a list of these cases.
174. Id. at 30.
175. Id. at 30-31. See also supra note 96 (explaining the distinction between conditional
and unconditional refusals).
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from now onwards.
III. OPEN ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
A. The European and American Systems: A Summary
In the European Union, refusal to share IP rights is possibly
considered vertical foreclosure, consistently with the case law on mere
refusal to deal and the EF doctrine, requiring the distinction between an
upstream market of the IP-protected asset and a downstream market of
the product embodying this asset (two different stages of production are
176
However, an additional test applies to refusals to
also sufficient).
share IP rights: not only must the intangible asset be an EF-like asset,
177
but also a “new product” requirement should be met.
Yet the
balancing test applied in Microsoft makes the binding nature and the
extent of this standard more uncertain, while its implications for the
future antitrust enforcement and policy involving IP rights in Europe
178
In any case, beyond the applicable test, a mismatch
remain unclear.
between the national enforcement of IP rights, and the (primary)
community enforcement of antitrust, in combination with the European
antitrust bodies’ lack of power to assess (validity and interpretation of)
IP rights marks a significant limit of the system.
In the United States the clear trend is towards shielding IP rights
against antitrust. Few exceptions to the immunity are expressly
179
admitted, although to what extent is not clear. Unlike their European
counterpart, U.S. courts and agencies are clearly inclined to think that
IP deserves a special regime, distinct from ordinary property; indeed, on
many occasions they declined to apply the EF standards for refusal to
180
deal with IP rights. Moreover, not only are IP rights seen as being in
need of special governing rules, but also each IP right is given its own
181
regime (so stated expressly for patents and copyrights).
A question
mark remains on the relevance of intent in refusal to license patents, at
least since the split between the Courts of Appeals for the Federal

176. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
177. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
178. See supra Part II.A.1-2 and note 62.
179. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
180. See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. 398.
181. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (2006)(governing patents); 17 U.S.C. §§ 1011332 (2996)(governing copyrights).
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Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. Also the formula of the “scope” of the
patent, likely coterminous with the safe harbor area, is open to different
interpretations. The split between different courts, with the Federal
Circuit’s (and several other Circuits’) bias for patents and the lack of
specific opinions by the Supreme Court, renders the system unsettled.
On the whole, it is clear that European antitrust bodies are more
worried than their American colleagues about anticompetitive risks
arising from borderline uses of IP rights and the risk that those
borderline uses will lead to loss of innovation incentives; the reverse is
also arguably true.
This divide has its roots in the history of the antitrust/IP interface,
respectively in the European Union and United States, and is
conditioned upon the previously seen structural differences between the
two experiences. Moreover, it reflects distinct approaches to antitrust
law and policy, the American system being traditionally more
libertarian and open to the Chicago School’s theories, while a distinctive
trait of the European system has been, since its origin, the pursuit of the
integration of national markets.
However, things are changing rapidly, with the European system
converging towards the American economic-based model. The recent
Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 is but one example of
this relative convergence; only relative, though, because the European
documents expressly list the pursuit of consumers’ welfare among
ultimate goals of antitrust law, and with specific reference to IP rights,
the DG Discussion Paper is very far away from the strands envisaged by
the Joint Report, while Magill, IMS, and Microsoft are not consistent
183
with Trinko’s philosophy.
B. Open Issues
Neither the case law nor the guidance supplied by recent policy
documents offer a definitive answer to the issue of when and under what
conditions refusals to share IP rights trigger antitrust liability. Many
questions remain open, a provisional checklist of which can be drawn up
as follows:
• whether the distinction between the existence and exercise of
IP rights (European Union) has any analytical relevance for

182. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
183. DG Discussion Paper, supra note 68; JOINT REPORT, supra note 151; Magill, 1995
E.C.R. I-743; IMS, 2004 E,C.R. I-5039; Trinko, 540 U.S. 398.
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184

•
•

•
•

•

•

•

•

the purposes of applying antitrust rules and if so what it is
(e.g., its role in determining the market power/dominance of
the IP rights holder);
whether it is viable to apply equally the EF doctrine to IP
rights and to any other physical property (opposite solutions
in the European Union and United States);
when EF doctrine does apply to IP (in the European Union),
whether only vertical competition matters or also horizontal
competition may play a role—this question involves the
issues of the need that the IP owner be present, directly or
indirectly, in the same market where the applicant operates,
the new product test, and the degree of foreclosure required,
absolute or relative (not settled in the European Union);
in general, whether IP deserves a different regime than other
forms of property (partially opposite solutions in the
European Union and United States);
whether different legal standards should apply to refusals to
start to supply and refusals to continue to supply (apparently,
affirmative answers in the European Union and United
States);
whether patents and other IP rights (e.g., copyright,
trademark) each deserve special tailored regimes, rather
than a standardized one, when attacked under antitrust rules
185
(affirmative answer in the United States);
whether and how determining the scope of the IP rights at
issue is essential for the purpose of defining the area of
exclusivity, coterminous with the area of immunity, and who
can make that determination (United States and European
Union theoretically used the concept, but they did not define
it, nor infer the consequences);
whether and how the intent of the IP owner is relevant in
antitrust cases (split in the United States), and, if so, whether
it is possible to consider its two dimensions, subjective and
objective;
whether a balanced system of presumptions, complemented
with fine-tuned procedural rules on the burden of proof,

184. Very critical of this distinction are Ricolfi and Korah. Ricolfi, supra note 46, at
169; Korah, supra note 26, at 805.
185. Ricolfi, supra note 46, at 169.
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•
•

•

•

might answer satisfyingly the quest for clarity and certainty
in the field;
whether additional guidance to draw the distinction between
lawful and unlawful refusals rests on whether they are
conditional (contractual) or unconditional;
whether antitrust enforcement is a proper instrument to fight
against “bad,” “weak” or “utilitarian” IP rights (European
Union de facto inclined to answer affirmatively) instead of
acting via other instruments (e.g., internal to the IP system),
which triggers the further question whether antitrust
enforcement can be effectively used to react to or contain the
IP expansionistic trend;
linked with the previous issue, when misuse doctrine is
applicable in infringement claims (in the United States),
what are the boundaries and proper domains respectively of
antitrust defense and misuse defense; and
whether compulsory licensing is an appropriate remedy when
antitrust liability is found (affirmative answer in the
European Union), and related issues (e.g., are courts and
agencies equipped enough to set fees at a level which do not
frustrate the expected revenue from R&D investment?
Doing so, do they not transform themselves improperly into
regulators?)
C. The International Setting

The latest issue introduces a new facet: if unilateral refusals to share
IP rights were found to violate the antitrust laws, one appropriate
remedy likely would entail compulsory licensing. However, as the
above analysis of the case law showed, so far this problematic measure
has been adopted mostly under domestic rules, whereas the
186
international dimension has been neglected.
187
Among applicable treaties,
first and foremost, the TRIPs
188
Agreement, the dominant instrument in the current international IP
186. The question arose in Magill, in which one appellant against the compulsory
license alleged that the order was inconsistent with the Berne Convention, but the issue was
solved procedurally, since this Convention was deemed as non applicable to the case. Magill,
1995 E.C.R. I-743.
187. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS, & LEMLEY, supra note 96, §§ 40.1-40.2.
188. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33, I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs
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scenario, must be taken into account, the relevant provisions being
189
Article 31, on patent compulsory licensing, as well as Articles 7, 8, 40,
190
This set of
and possibly others dealing more broadly with antitrust.
rules tackles both the control of anticompetitive practices in contract
licenses and the remedy against anticompetitive unilateral behaviors by
dominant firms. Yet the language of all such provisions is always fluid,
at the outer boundaries of ambiguity. So it is for the specific regime of
patent compulsory license, as is made clear from what follows.
Under Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement, when a patent is
exploited in anticompetitive manners, WTO Member States may
191
provide for the grant of compulsory licenses. This provision lays down
a much more complex regime, for both substantive and procedural
matters, than does the earlier regime on compulsory license within the
192
1883 Paris Convention, under Articles 5, 5A(2), and 5A(3).
It is worth noting that Section 5 of the TRIPs Agreement (from
Article 27 through Article 34) sets forth the minimum substantive
standards for patents, which—among all the standards for IP—are
probably the most significant in the specific context of the IP/antitrust
193
Amid the rights conferred upon the patentee, Article
interface.
28(1)(a) lists the rights to “prevent third parties not having [the owner’s]
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing for these purposes” the product that is the subject matter of
the patent. Similar rights are conferred by Article 28(1)(b) upon the
patentee of a process. Moreover, under Article 28(2), “[p]atent owners
“shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent
194
and to conclude licensing contracts.”
Article 30 identifies a first set of “limited exceptions” to the
exclusivity so conferred, which might come from the choice of individual
member states “provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
195
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”
A second set of limits to the exclusive rights of the patentee comes
Agreement]. Both the United States and European Union adhere to this Agreement.
189. Id. art. 31.
190. Id. arts. 7, 8, 40.
191. Id. art. 31.
192. Id.; HOVENKAMP, JANIS, & LEMLEY, supra note 96, § 40.2a2.
193. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 188, arts. 27-34.
194. Id. art. 28.
195. Id. art. 30.
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from the compulsory license regime. Broadly speaking, the grant of
compulsory license, in favor of either private parties or governments,
might stem either from an “abuse” of the patent (e.g., for failure to
work), or from public interests (e.g., a pandemic). The compulsory
license for anticompetitive conducts is squared away in the latter
category of the pursuit of public interest.
Although the general framework is clear, what remains unclear is
which and when anticompetitive behaviors may trigger compulsory
license. With this regard, the TRIPs Agreement only provides for some
procedural aspects.
In fact, under Article 31(k), where the law of a Member State allows
196
for “use other than that allowed under Article 30” of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder,
Member States are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in
subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a
practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be
taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such
197
cases.
Hence the specific provision only exempts the compulsory license
for antitrust purpose from the observation of subparagraph (b) of
Article 31 (which asks for “efforts” to be made in order to get a
negotiated license prior to the application for the compulsory license)
and subparagraph (f) of Article 31 (which limits the authorized use
“predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use”), while all other requisites provided under Article
198
Moreover, it
31 for any kind of compulsory license must apply.
establishes that the remuneration for such license can be tailored upon
the need to correct the anticompetitive practices; whether this “need”
might include punitive curtailments of royalties in order to deter other
199
patentees from acting against competition is not clear.
On the whole, Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement is neutral
regarding any anticompetitive conduct that may trigger compulsory
license. Nor does it give any insight on the definition of the relevant
market, a factor which is very crucial in all cases of unilateral
anticompetitive conduct.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. art. 31 n. 7.
Id. art. 31(k).
Id. art. 31.
Id.
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However, this does not mean at all that each court or administrative
body of Member Countries enforcing antitrust laws can grant as many
and as broad compulsory licenses as they like: at minimum, the TRIPs
Agreement works on top as a general ceiling as for the minimum
standards provided.
In other words, when granting a compulsory license, courts and
competition agencies have to refrain from impinging upon exclusive
“minimum” rights conferred upon the patentee by the TRIPs
Agreement. The interpretation of these standards in the occasion of
international disputes arising under Parts V-VII of the TRIPs
Agreement is also relevant to this purpose.
Arguably, other
international treaties have the same function, only provided the acting
state is an adhering Member.
This framework has a direct impact on antitrust enforcement
involving IP rights: all discussions on the scope of these rights cannot
avoid considering the international dimension set forth by applicable
international treaties.
However, the logic of the negative limit is neither the only, nor
perhaps the most important part of the international setting of IP and
200
antitrust interplay. With this regard, an intriguing theory suggests to
use integrally the antitrust portions of the TRIPS Agreement, including
Articles 7 and 8, as well as Recitals 5 and 6, to envisage generalized ex
ante measures in such a way so as to permanently incorporate procompetitive features (such as access, requirements, scope of protection,
limitations, and exceptions) intended to preserve competitive openness
201
This opinion, warning against
in downstream innovation markets.
risky case-by-case, ex post interventions, might provide a finer balance
of the interests at issue, of the IP owners and the actors in the markets,
without contradicting the basic premises of TRIPs-mandated minimum
protection.
This proposal seems to deserve more attention by scholars and
202
antitrust enforcers. The ex ante method offers a remedy which has the

200. Marco Ricolfi, Is There an Antitrust Antidote Against IP Overprotection Within
TRIPs?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305 (2006).
201. Contra Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property and Reductionist
Competition Rules: A TRIPs Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 401 (2004).
202. Another attempt to reconcile antitrust and IP is that of Ghidini, for whom
antitrust acts like a thermostat, checking IP rights if and when the market power or conduct
of the IP owner exceeds that inherently linked to their essential function, i.e., protection of
innovators’ achievements against free riders and protection of firms’ identities and renown.
GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW. THE INNOVATION

46 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1

advantage, among others, of being more predictable in its outcome,
avoiding likely discrimination among competitors acting in the market
while reacting more effectively against the gradual ratcheting up of IP
203
protection.
To this purpose, a new proactive approach by all institutions
involved is required: the advocacy power granted to antitrust bodies has
204
a crucial role within this solution, while also collateral institutions,
such as bodies that grant IP rights and influence competition, should
play their part and recognize the value of non-litigation instruments in
205
formulating competition policy.
CONCLUSION
The practice gives a long array of approaches on when and to what
extent the use of a patent triggers antitrust liability (with or without
compulsory license), with opposite solutions not only among different
countries but also within one single country.
So it is for the United States, comparing the rule adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in the Kodak II case and the opposite rule adopted by the
Federal Circuit in the Xerox case. Notably, so far, none of the Supreme
Court cases have either squarely granted immunity from antitrust to
unilateral refusals to license or clarified whether IP rights deserve a
special antitrust regime. However, there is a clear bent towards IP, and
NEXUS (2006). Moreover, IP often contains built in “antibodies that promote competitive
innovation” and “antitrust law, while discouraging rent-seeking position . . . . [This] gives the
green light to IP rights exploitation against free-riding of innovators’ achievement.” Id. The
same author carries on: “the two branches of law show a multifaceted, dialectic and ultimate
convergence towards an industrial policy goal: that of the enhancement of competitive
dynamics of innovation” and then concludes “It is this convergence that on the legal side
justifies, indeed requires, that the framework of IP law be interpreted in the light of the same
principle, of constitutional rank, that guides antitrust law, i.e., freedom of competition.” Id.
at 7-8.
203. On the trend towards IP over-protectionism and “privatization” of common goods
in the context of a global intellectual property regime, see INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 227-264 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) and all the line of
thought of Reichman. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994).
204. Interestingly, the JOINT REPORT also underlines the importance of the interaction
between patent and competition communities through cooperation between competition
agencies and patent offices and an increased use of the competition advocacy role by these
agencies. JOINT REPORT, supra note 151; GHIDINI, supra note 202, at 17-18, ch. 6.
205. See William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property: Redefining
the Role of Competition Agencies, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US
PERSPECTIVES 2 (Francois Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005).
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the antitrust policy and philosophy embodied in Trinko stand more for a
permissive than restrictive approach towards dominant firms.
In turn, the European experience is going towards a system of
competition at any cost—even at the cost of discouraging internal and
international investments—as the escalation starting from Magill to
Microsoft makes it clear. Yet a caveat is needed here: so far, the
European competition courts and agencies have never challenged any
patents; moreover, they are not even empowered to interpret patents or
other IP rights or decide their validity, creating a mismatch between the
Community competition enforcement and the national IP enforcement.
In contrast, the assessment of the scope of protection is crucial in these
cases.
206
It is not easy to hold a favor for one or the other solution.
Abstractly, they are both consistent with the international intellectual
property setting, which is scattered and in any case neutral on the
matter, at least for the ex-post antitrust control option. More promising
appears the suggestion to explore the potential for ex-ante limitations
for the same purposes, if a cooperative climate could be established
among all institutions involved.
In this perspective, the delicate balance between the right to exclude
held by the IP owner and the possible duty to share intangible assets for
antitrust purposes might be more easily achieved by replacing the issue
within a virtuously read international dimension.
All possible options to answer the open issues reported above in the
207
not-exhaustive checklist should be assessed, while the relationship
between the concepts of the abuse of IP rights, under Article 8.2 of the
TRIPs Agreement, and the abuse of (absolute or relative) market
208
power should be explored more in depth. Perhaps the answer on how
to avoid the pitfalls of IP and antitrust interplay stems from this
additional effort.

206. More in favor of the flexible European approach is Arezzo, supra note 3, at 505.
In contrast, for the enlightenment of the benefits of the American way, inter alia to preserve
incentives for innovation, see Reichenberger, supra note 24, at 564.
207. See supra Section III.B.
208. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 188, art. 8.2.

